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THE MANY LIVES—AND FACES—OF 
LEX MERCATORIA: HISTORY AS 
GENEALOGY IN INTERNATIONAL 
BUSINESS LAW 
NIKITAS E. HATZIMIHAIL* 
“Lex mercatoria is a venerable old lady who has twice disappeared from the face of 
the earth and twice been resuscitated.”1 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
For over a half century, it has been claimed that cross-border business 
transactions are governed by a transnational body of norms specific to 
international trade, generally known as lex mercatoria, the “law merchant.” 
This legal phenomenon is in fact often described as the “new” lex mercatoria, as 
distinguished from the “ancient” law merchant, which purportedly flourished in 
medieval and early modern Europe. 
Reading about lex mercatoria is reminiscent of the proverbial Arlésienne: we 
never get to see her but everyone talks about her.2 In fact, many have denied lex 
mercatoria’s existence.3 Between skeptics and “mercatorists,” a veritable lex 
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 1. Berthold Goldman, Lex Mercatoria, 3 FORUM INTERNATIONALE 3, 3 (Nov. 1983). 
 2. In French, the expression l’Arlésienne (as in jouer l’Arlésienne) refers to someone about whom 
there is much talk but who never shows herself. It originates from a famous drama revolving around 
the doomed love of a young man for a girl from Arles: whereas everyone talks about her, l’Arlésienne 
never appears on stage. See ALPHONSE DAUDET, L’ARLESIENNE: PIECE EN TROIS ACTES ET CINQ 
TABLEAUX (1872).  
 3. See, e.g., Jean-Denis Bredin, La loi du juge, in LE DROIT DES RELATIONS ÉCONOMIQUES 
INTERNATIONALES: ÉTUDES OFFERTES A BERTHOLD GOLDMAN 15 (1982); George Delaume, The 
Myth of Lex Mercatoria and State Contracts, in LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION: A DISCUSSION 
OF THE NEW LAW MERCHANT 77 (Thomas Carbonneau ed., 1990); Paul Lagarde, Approche critique de 
la lex mercatoria, in LE DROIT DES RELATIONS ÉCONOMIQUES INTERNATIONALES: ÉTUDES 
OFFERTES A BERTHOLD GOLDMAN 125 (1982); The Rt. Hon. Lord Justice Michael Mustill, The New 
Lex Mercatoria: The First Twenty-Five Years, 4 ARB. INT’L 86 (1988); Charalambos Pamboukis, Lex 
Mercatoria: An International Régime Without State?, 46 REVUE HELLÉNIQUE DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL 261, 262–63 (1993). As to the negative reaction of, especially, Anglo-American 
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mercatoria discourse has been created.4 Alongside doctrinal lawyers from 
several legal fields (the vibrant new field of international business law, the 
conflict of laws, commercial law, even contract law), the discourse has come to 
involve an increased number of legal theorists—including socio-legal scholars5 
and legal economists of various stripes.6 
A. What Is Lex Mercatoria? 
Lex mercatoria has been variously described by its advocates as “a set of 
general principles and customary rules spontaneously referred to or elaborated 
in the framework of international trade, without reference to a particular 
national system of law,”7 a “regime for international trade, spontaneously and 
progressively produced by the societas mercatorum,”8 “a single autonomous 
body of law created by the international business community,”9 “a hybrid legal 
system finding its sources both in national or international law and in the 
vaguely defined region of general principles . . . called ‘Transnational law’”10—
but also as “[the] phenomenon of uniform rules serving uniform needs of 
international business and economic co-operation,”11 or as consisting of “all law 
                                                                                                                                                        
practitioners, see YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 41 
n.19 (1996) (“These people are deciding by the seat of their pants. There’s no such thing as the lex 
mercatoria.” (quoting a “well known English QC from the commercial bar”); “And we don’t want lex 
mercatoria. We want to know what law it is. In fact we want to know which procedural law it is. We 
don’t want to leave it up to the arbitrator.” (quoting an unidentified “American lawyer in Paris”)). 
 4. The diversity of opinion is illustrated in the essays contained in LEX MERCATORIA AND 
ARBITRATION, supra note 3, and in THE PRACTICE OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW (Klaus-Peter Berger 
ed., 2001). See also FILALI OSMAN, LES PRINCIPES GÉNÉRAUX DE LA LEX MERCATORIA: 
CONTRIBUTION À L’ETUDE D’UN ORDRE JURIDIQUE ANATIONAL (1992); KLAUS-PETER BERGER, 
THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF THE LEX MERCATORIA (1999). 
 5. See, e.g., Gunther Teubner, “Global Bukowina”: Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in 
GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997) [hereinafter Global Bukowina]; 
Gunther Teubner, Breaking Frames: Economic Globalization and the Emergence of Lex Mercatoria, 5 
EUR. J. SOC. TH. 199 (2002); Peer Zumbansen, Piercing the Legal Veil: Commercial Arbitration and 
Transnational Law, 8 EUR. L. J. 400, 400 (2002); Joanna Jemielnak, Legitimation Arguments in the Lex 
Mercatoria Cases, 18 INT’L J. FOR THE SEMIOTICS OF LAW 175 (2005). For a summary and excellent 
restatement of the issues involved, see Ralf Michaels, The True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State, 
14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 447  (2007). 
 6. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of 
Decentralized Law, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 215, 216–17 (1994); Bruce Benson, The Spontaneous 
Evolution of Commercial Law, 55 S. ECON. J. 644 (1989). Cf. AVNER GREIF, INSTITUTIONS AND THE 
PATH TO THE MODERN ECONOMY: LESSONS FROM MEDIEVAL TRADE (2006). 
 7. Berthold Goldman, The Applicable Law: General Principles of Law—the Lex Mercatoria, in 
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 113, 116 (Julian Lew ed., 1986). 
 8. Berthold Goldman, Introduction, in LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION, supra note 3, at 
xviii. 
 9. Bernardo Cremades & Steven Plehn, The New Lex Mercatoria and the Harmonization of the 
Laws of the of International Commercial Transactions, 2 B.U. INT’L L. REV. 317, 324 (1984). 
 10. Horacio Grigera Naón, in THE TRANSNATIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
TRANSACTIONS 89, 90 (Norbert Horn ed., 1982) [hereinafter TRANSNATIONAL LAW]. 
 11. Norbert Horn, Introduction, in TRANSNATIONAL LAW, supra note 10, at 14. 
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stemming from or under the influence of transnational sources of law and 
regulating acts or events that transcend national frontiers.”12 
The divergence of opinion is noticeable even at the level of definition. 
There is disagreement as to the legal nature of lex mercatoria (is it a “legal 
system” complete with its metanorms, a “body of law” less systematic but 
rather coherent, or a “phenomenon”?), as to the process of its creation 
(spontaneous or evolutionary), and as to the lawmaking role of business actors 
themselves. The main dividing line concerns the relationship of lex mercatoria 
with state law and more generally the states system. There are two main camps: 
the former—call them “purists” or “autonomists”—insist on the “a-national” or 
“stateless” character of lex mercatoria. The latter—call them “integrationists”—
insist on the ability to “freely combine elements from national and non-national 
law.”13 
For all these approaches to come together under the banner of lex 
mercatoria, there must be a common cause, and some value in the name itself.14 
Indeed, all mercatorists seem to share a minimum degree of commitment to, 
and desire for, the existence of certain norms (and dispute-settlement 
mechanisms) distinct from—and possibly transcending—“traditional” state law 
and “municipal” legal forms and institutions. Such normative commitment is 
not limited to doctrinal lawyers; even socio-legal theorists, such as Gunther 
Teubner, who appear uninterested in the optimal regulation of international 
commerce by itself, look to lex mercatoria as a key example of the existence of 
stateless, autopoetic, or global regimes.15 But not everyone under the banner 
views lex mercatoria as the inevitable adversary of state law. For some, it seems 
to epitomize a sensibility of legal cosmopolitanism—as in the comparative 
consideration of foreign legal material, or in evocations of “natural” law.16 
In the end, regardless of whether an autonomous legal system of 
transnational commercial law exists now or shall exist in the near future, today 
lex mercatoria exists as a concept, with strong resonance and powerful symbolic 
capital. It is this power that is reflected not only in the interest of theorists, but 
also in modern pronouncements of lex mercatoria spin-offs, such as the lex 
                                                          
 12. Norbert Horn, The Use of Transnational Law in the Contract Law of International Trade and 
Finance, in THE PRACTICE OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW, supra note 4, at 67. 
 13. Michaels, supra note 5. Michaels demonstrates the pervasiveness of this opposition in 
contemporary discussion, but the dividing line cuts across time more than he indicates, as is shown by 
the comparison here of Schmitthoff and Goldman. 
 14. The terms “transnational law” and “transnational commercial law” have been used in recent 
years interchangeably with lex mercatoria. See, e.g., Joachim Bonnell, The Unidroit Principles and 
Transnational Law, in THE PRACTICE OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW, supra note 4, at 23. 
 15. See, e.g., Teubner, Global Bukowina, supra note 5, at 3. 
 16. See, e.g., Friedrich Juenger, The Lex Mercatoria and Private International Law, 60 LA. L. REV. 
1133, 1135, 1143 (2000) (claiming that medieval tribunals “elaborated [rules] by means of the 
comparative method,”  then referring to Lord Mansfield and especially to Justice Story as “firm 
believer[s] in the existence of a supranational law of commerce, as shown by his opinion in Swift v. 
Tyson.”). See also Friedrich Juenger, Some Random Remarks from Overseas, in THE PRACTICE OF 
TRANSNATIONAL LAW, supra note 4, at 81, 82–86 (reprising this narrative and lambasting the lack of 
use of foreign legal material in American law schools and conflicts cases and how this must change). 
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informatica or even a lex sportiva.17 It is also this symbolic power that raises 
stakes—political stakes—as to who will regulate cross-border transactions (and 
how), or as to whether the notions of “states system” and “state law” should be 
disposed of, defended, or reshaped. But this power also raises jurisprudential 
stakes—as to the need for scholars and policy considerations in the arena of 
commercial law, or as to the form the rules of international trade should take. 
B. The Historiography of Lex Mercatoria 
Historical imagery plays an important part in the lex mercatoria discourse. 
Claiming that mercantile rules derive from a merchant community and 
transcend time and space has been, in fact, a phenomenon older than lex 
mercatoria itself—perhaps as old as the assertion of some scholarly or 
institutional autonomy for commercial affairs.18 In the early twentieth century, 
almost forty years before the articulation of the modern lex mercatoria concept, 
the aptly entitled book The Romance of the Law Merchant 
transports us in the ships of Hiram with cargoes of gold and ivory, apes and peacocks, 
carries us in voyages along the Mediterranean and beyond trading for the 
Carthaginians, finds us making voyages in the Euxine in joint adventure with  Greeks, 
when our disputes will be determined by retaining the leaders of the Commercial 
Court at Athens, of whom Demosthenes is most in request: and will take us to all the 
fairs and markets of Europe: and expose us to the special customs of our old English 
towns.19 
Modern literature often invokes images of the “ancient” law merchant: 
autonomous, cosmopolitan, transnational.20 Such imagery is created both 
through comprehensive historical accounts and by casual references to a 
common historical consciousness.21 Invocations of the ancient law merchant are 
also recurring in the modern conflict-of-laws literature, as well as in domestic 
commercial law.22 They permeate the historical narratives in comparative law 
                                                          
 17. For an overview of the former, see Fabbrizio Marrella & Christopher S. Yoo, Is Open Software 
the New Lex Mercatoria?, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 807, 808 (2007). See also id. at 822 n.62 (listing proposed 
spinoff leges). As to the latter, see Ken Foster, Is There a Global Sports Law?, 2 ENT. L. 1 (2003). 
 18. See, e.g., GERARD MALYNES, MERCHANT, CONSUETUDO VEL LEX MERCATORIA OR THE 
ANCIENT LAW-MERCHANT 2 (1622) (referencing the Old Testament). 
 19. Rt. Hon. Sir Richard Atkin, Foreword to WYNDHAM ANSTIS BEWES, THE ROMANCE OF THE 
LAW MERCHANT iv (1923). 
 20. See, e.g., Marrella & Yoo, supra note 17, at 811–12; ANA M. LÓPEZ RODRÍGUEZ, LEX 
MERCATORIA AND HARMONIZATION OF CONTRACT LAW IN THE EU 87 (2003) (“[There] emerged ‘a 
body of truly customary rules governing the cosmopolitan community of international merchants’ on 
the high seas and in the conduct of fairs. Merchants had in fact created a superior law, the lex 
mercatoria, ius mercatorum or law merchant, which constituted a solid legal basis for the great 
development of commerce in the Middle Ages. For several hundred years uniform rules of law, those 
of the law merchant, were applied throughout the market tribunals of the various European trade 
centers.”). 
 21. See, e.g., LEON TRAKMAN, THE LAW MERCHANT: THE EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL LAW 7, 
7–21 (1983); FILIP DE LY, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW AND LEX MERCATORIA 7, 8–20 (1991); 
Irineu Strenger, La notion de lex mercatoria en droit du commerce international, 227 RECUEIL DES 
COURS 207, 253–60 (1991); FRANCESCO GALGANO, LEX MERCATORIA (2001). 
 22. See FRIEDRICH JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 15–16 (1993). 
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and in doctrinal legal history.23 The ancient law merchant even serves as case-
study material for economic theorists.24 
The evocation of a lex mercatoria genealogy can be more powerful than the 
present-day concept itself, as it invites less controversy among doctrinal lawyers 
in the mainstream of the discourse. “History” adds to the symbolic capital of lex 
mercatoria and confers on it (and stakeholders) a venerable pedigree. It also 
provides a blueprint for the future, as the modern lex mercatoria is presented in 
the genealogical narratives as either the reincarnation (rebirth) of the ancient 
law merchant or as the result of its evolution.25 
The power of this historical imagery masks its weak historical validation. 
Especially in recent years, a number of legal historians have refuted much of lex 
mercatoria genealogy, providing alternative stories about the legal treatment of 
commerce in medieval and early modern Europe.26 However, such historical 
revisionism has so far made few inroads among mercatorists or even in the 
mainstream of international business law: the romance of the law merchant still 
casts a powerful spell. 
That the mercatorists’ historical imagery persists in spite of these refutations 
suggests that what matters, for the debate, is not so much what actually 
happened, but what projections into the past align best with present 
circumstances and what constructions of the past are used to justify 
explanations of the present. 
This article illustrates twin points. First, far from being an extrinsic display 
of erudition, historical imagery about the ancient law merchant is employed to 
legitimate modern notions as to what the governance of international business 
transactions should be. Second, such historical imagery is almost as diverse as 
the divergent conceptions and agendas within the mercatorist coalition. A close 
                                                          
 23. See, e.g., HAROLD BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN 
LEGAL TRADITION 333 (1983). 
 24. See Cooter, supra note 6, at 216; Paul R. Milgrom, Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, 
The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne 
Fairs, 2 ECON. & POL. 1, 4–6 (1990). 
 25. See, e.g., Leon Trakman, From the Medieval Law Merchant to E-Merchant Law, 53 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 265, 269–70 (2003). 
 26. On the medieval law merchant, see Albert Cordes, The Search for a Medieval Lex Mercatoria, 
5 OXFORD UNIV. COMP. LAW FORUM (2003), available at http://ouclf.iuscomp.org/articles/cordes.shtml 
(last visited June 9, 2008); Charles Donahue, Benvenuto Stracca’s De Mercatura: Was There a Lex 
Mercatoria in Sixteenth-Century Italy?, in FROM LEX MERCATORIA TO COMMERCIAL LAW 69, 69 
(Vito Piergiovanni ed., 2005); Charles Donahue, Medieval and Early Modern Lex Mercatoria: An 
Attempt at the Probatio Diabolica, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 21, 21 (2004); Charles Donahue, Equity in the 
Courts of Merchants, 72 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR RECHTSGESCHIEDENIS 1, 1 (2004); Nicholas Foster, 
Foundation Myth as Legal Formant: The Medieval Law Merchant and the New Lex Mercatoria, FORUM 
HISTORIAE JURIS, available at http://www.forhistiur.de/zitat/0503foster.htm (last visited June 9, 2008); 
JAMES ROGERS, THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES: A STUDY OF THE ORIGINS 
OF ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMERCIAL LAW (1995) (providing a comprehensive revisionist story of 
Anglo-American mercantile law from the medieval royal courts to the nineteenth century); Stephen M. 
Sachs, From St. Ives to Cyberspace: The Modern Distortion of the Medieval ‘Law Merchant,’ 21 AM. U. 
INT’L L. REV. 685, 685–86 (2006); see generally LEX MERCATORIA AND LEGAL PLURALISM: A LATE 
THIRTEENTH-CENTURY TREATISE AND ITS AFTERLIFE (Mary Elizabeth Basile et al. eds., 1998) 
(providing a comprehensive account of the concept of law merchant as well as the detailed analysis of 
what may be the oldest treatise on mercantile law). 
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examination of mercatorist historical narratives will allow us to scrutinize the 
efforts at legitimation and to better understand the normative agenda and the 
structure of arguments employed in the lex mercatoria discourse.27 
To illustrate these points, this article examines in detail two paradigmatic 
narratives of lex mercatoria historiography: the principal historical accounts 
provided by the two founding fathers of the modern lex mercatoria, Clive 
Schmitthoff and Berthold Goldman.28 These two historical accounts come from 
two classic essays providing a comprehensive outlook of the authors’ respective 
worldviews and normative projects: genealogical narratives form a vital part of 
the argument in both essays.29 
Schmitthoff and Goldman were instrumental in the formation and shaping 
of the lex mercatoria discourse from its beginnings in the early 1960s until the 
late 1980s. More generally, they played important roles in the academic 
elaboration of international commercial law and international commercial 
arbitration.30 They are also regarded as emblematic of the two basic approaches 
to lex mercatoria—with Schmitthoff emphasizing the use of state and nonstate 
sources, and Goldman insisting on the stateless (a-national) character of lex 
mercatoria. 
                                                          
 27. The article also forms part of a broader project of studying the historiography of private 
international law. See Nikitas Hatzimihail, Pages of History: Friedrich Juenger and the Historical 
Consciousness of Modern Private International Law, in TRADITION AND INNOVATION OF PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE BEGINNING OF THE THIRD MILLENNIUM 81 (L. Pereznieto Castro et 
al. eds., 2006); Nikitas Hatzimihail, On Mapping the Conceptual Battlefield of Private International Law, 
13 HAGUE Y.B. INT’L L. 57 (2000); NIKITAS HATZIMIHAIL, PRE-CLASSICAL CONFLICT OF LAWS 
(forthcoming 2009). 
 28. See, e.g., Charalambos Pamboukis, Lex mercatoria reconsiderée, in LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 
PRIVE, ESPRIT ET METHODES: MELANGES EN L’HONNEUR DE PAUL LAGARDE 565, 568–69 (2005). 
The claim of Schmitthoff and Goldman as founding fathers is universally acknowledged. On the 
contrary, any claims of a third nominee have been sporadic and localized: the Yugoslav Alexander 
Goldstaijn, who participated in Schmitthoff’s East–West projects, has not had an enduring legacy; 
Philippe Kahn was Goldman’s doctoral student and successor as head of the so-called “Dijon school”: 
his doctoral work on international sales law (with his reference to a “société internationale des 
commerçants”) is regarded as foundational. PHILIPPE KAHN, LA VENTE COMMERCIALE 
INTERNATIONALE (1964). 
 29. Clive Schmitthoff, The Unification of the Law of International Trade, 1968 J. BUS. L. 105, 105–
09 (1968); Berthold Goldman, Lex Mercatoria, 3 FORUM INTERNATIONALE 3, 3–7 (Nov. 1983). 
 30. Goldman and Schmitthoff may also be seen as representatives of the two western legal 
cultures—“Cartesian logic” and “Anglo-American pragmatism”—regarded as having long been 
opposed to each other and finally joined in the world of international arbitration and transnational 
business law. Both were extremely prolific during a prolonged period, and in fact the ideas and rhetoric 
of both evolved over time. Each created “schools”—both in the “substantive” sense of propagating 
ideas and adherents and in the “formal” sense of fostering institutional centers of research on 
transnational commercial law. Their intellectual contribution to the field is almost matched by their 
status in its genealogy. 
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II 
CLIVE SCHMITTHOFF: LAW MERCHANT AS EVER-EVOLVING (AND ALL-
ENCOMPASSING) 
A. Clive Schmitthoff Situated 
Clive M. Schmitthoff (1903–1990) started his academic career in German 
commercial law. In 1933, he migrated to England, effectively starting anew.31 
Although he also published, mainly in the 1940s, in comparative law and the 
conflict of laws,32 Schmitthoff’s principal field of academic work remained in 
commercial law properly speaking, and he indeed contributed to its 
development as an academic field in the United Kingdom. In 1957, he founded 
the Journal of Business Law (remaining at its helm until his death). 
Schmitthoff’s Export Trade, now in its eleventh edition, remains to this day one 
of the best textbooks on international business law, rich on detail yet friendly to 
the novice student.33 He was also active in legal practice, establishing a 
reputation in international commercial arbitration and participating in 
international-law cases such as Barcelona Traction.34 
Schmitthoff eventually became involved in attempts by the United Nations 
to build a new framework for international economic relations. He was the 
main drafter of the 1966 Report of the UN Secretary-General to the UN 
General Assembly on the Progressive Development of the Law of International 
Trade—the report that triggered the creation of the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).35 
Unlike Goldman, Schmitthoff made no direct contribution to legal theory. 
He was, after all, a German émigré in the metropolis of legal pragmatism—
England. Yet Schmitthoff’s normative agenda was more ambitious, or at least 
more explicit and concrete, than Goldman’s. 
Schmitthoff’s lex mercatoria first appears in the context of the East–West 
divide. Indeed, the London Conference on the Sources of the Law of 
International Trade, which gave rise to a foundational collection of essays, was 
conceived with this divide in mind.36 Schmitthoff viewed the “political” gap 
                                                          
 31. See John N. Adams, Clive M. Schmitthoff (1903–1990), in JURISTS UPROOTED: GERMAN-
SPEAKING ÉMIGRÉ LAWYERS IN TWENTIETH CENTURY BRITAIN (Jack Beatson & Reinhard 
Zimmermann eds., 2004); See also Frank Woolbridge, Professor Clive Schmitthoff, J. BUS. L. 459 
(1990). 
 32. See generally Clive M. Schmitthoff, The Science of Comparative Law, 7 CAMBRIDGE  L.J. 94 
(1939); CLIVE SCHMITTHOFF, THE ENGLISH CONFLICT OF LAWS (3d ed. 1954). The work had three 
editions until 1954 and was quite popular with students. 
 33. CAROLE MURRAY ET AL., SCHMITTHOFF’S EXPORT TRADE: THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE (2007). 
 34. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd., 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 3. 
 35. Secretary-General, Progressive Development of the Law of International Trade: Report of the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. A/6396 (1966). 
 36. See Clive M. Schmitthoff, Introduction, in THE SOURCES OF THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE ix (Clive M. Schmitthoff ed., 1964) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL TRADE]; Clive M. 
Schmitthoff, The Law of International Trade, its Growth, Formulation and Operation, in 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra at 3. Reference to the conference as a whole, with special reference to 
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between East and West as having poisoned the “municipal” theory of private 
law.37 His goal was to construct the law of international trade as a bridge over 
that gap. He notes that the modern law merchant is “practically the same in all 
countries of the world. Its similarity transcends the division of the world into 
countries of free-market economy and centrally planned economy and of 
common law or Roman law tradition.”38 
According to Schmitthoff, unification in 1968 proceeds through the work of 
various institutions, “some of [which] are intergovernmental agencies and 
others [which] are voluntary organizations of non-governmental character.”39 
Schmitthoff’s criterion for judging the organizations he lists—which range from 
COMECON to the International Law Association40—is not their nature or 
degree of politicization, but the extent to which they have been successful in 
furthering the goal of unification. Admittedly, and despite some great successes, 
“[e]ach of these organizations has a limited aim and a limited membership,”41 
namely among countries belonging to the same economic system or the same 
region,42 which is why he hails the creation of the UNCITRAL).43 
Schmitthoff is not concerned with the “purity” in the sources of the new law 
merchant. The law of international trade is “derived from two sources . . . 
international legislation and international commercial custom.”44 Schmitthoff 
acknowledges the possibility that “regional unification and national legislation 
might retard the possibility of achieving a global unification of international 
trade law,” but “partial success on the regional and national level is preferable 
to total failure.”45 “There is no doubt that the resulting picture, from the 
viewpoint of the legal academician, will be bewildering and of startling 
novelty,”46 but then 
                                                                                                                                                        
Schmitthoff’s general report, is the first footnote in Goldman’s Frontières du droit et lex mercatoria. 
Goldman, infra note 88, at 177. 
 37. See Schmitthoff, supra note 36, at ix, 3. 
 38. Schmitthoff, supra note 29, at 109. 
 39. Id. at 112. 
 40. See id. at 112–13. The intergovernmental agency list consists of “the Rome International 
Institute for the Unification of Private Law” (UNIDROIT), the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law, “the Council for Mutual Economic Aid” (COMECON), and the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe. The nongovernmental organizations listed are the International 
Chamber of Commerce in Paris, the Comité Maritime International in Antwerp, and the International 
Law Association in London. 
 41. Id. at 112. 
 42. Id. at 113 (“These limitations to countries adhering to the same economic system or being 
situated in the same region were in the past a sort of strength enabling the international organizations 
to produce viable and practical solutions to problems of international trade, but since the beginning of 
the sixties it has become evident that their isolationism and lack of coordination was out of tune with 
the growing demand for international cooperation.”). 
 43. See Schmitthoff, supra note 29, at 113–19 (concluding with a quotation of the Indian Endre 
Ustor hailing “the painless birth of UNCITRAL” as “a sign of international solidarity, a beacon of 
hope and of trust of peace”). 
 44. Id. at 109. 
 45. Id. at 112. 
 46. Id. at 111–12. 
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the concept of a global and universal code of international trade law introduced into 
the national laws of all countries is not only unrealistic at the present juncture but 
might easily become a straitjacket which could slow down the growth of commercial 
practices and usages and could stifle the continued creation of customary law by the 
international business community.47 
In other words, Schmitthoff would certainly have something rather than 
nothing, and may in fact prefer many somethings to one, single, big everything. 
To defend his approach and inspire confidence in the project, he provides a 
historical tale leading logically to this “entirely new phenomenon.”48 
B. A Story of Evolution 
Schmitthoff’s tale is of the development of international commercial law in 
three “phases.” 
The re-awakening of the international conscience has led to a new phase in the 
development of the law of international trade. International commercial law has 
developed in three stages. It arose in the Middle Ages in the form of the law 
merchant, a body of truly international customary rules governing the cosmopolitan 
community of international merchants who traveled through the civilized world from 
port to port and fair to fair. The second phase began with the incorporation of the law 
merchant into the national systems of law, a process which, though universal, was 
carried out in the various countries at different times and for different reasons. The 
third phase is contemporary; it aims at the unification of international trade law on an 
international level and has given rise to a new law merchant which reflects the 
international spirit of our time in the political and economic sphere.49 
1. The Middle Ages: The Vision of Community 
Schmitthoff presents medieval mercantile law as a body, a complex of 
customary rules that are truly international. These rules were thus not created 
by political institutions and sovereigns of “local” scope. Indeed, they catered to 
the community of international merchants, who were cosmopolitan—probably 
in spirit and certainly in their needs.50 Schmitthoff quotes the comparative-law 
professor lawyer Rudolf Schlesinger to the effect that “cosmopolitan in nature 
and inherently superior to the general law, the law merchant by the end of the 
medieval period had become the very foundation of an expanding commerce 
throughout the Western world.”51 Indeed, the “remarkable feature,” what 
effectively pieces together these four factors, is that this “old law merchant 
was . . . developed by the international business community itself and not by 
lawyers.”52 Even the notary public becomes less of a lawyer in Schmitthoff’s 
narrative, referred to as “that ubiquitous and versatile medieval practitioner in 
whose hands lay a good deal of commercial legal work.”53 
                                                          
 47. Id. at 112. 
 48. Schmitthoff, supra note 29, at 112. 
 49. Id. at 105–06 (emphasis added). 
 50. Id. at 106. 
 51. Id. at 107 (quoting RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 185 (2d ed. 1960)). 
 52. Id. at 106. 
 53. Schmitthoff, supra note 29, at 106. 
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The medieval law merchant “owed its international character mainly to four 
factors: the unifying effect of the law of the fairs . . . the universality of the 
customs of the sea, the special courts dealing with commercial disputes, and the 
activities of the notary public.”54 The law of the fairs, Schmitthoff emphasizes, 
was “almost as universal as the law of the church.”55 This bold statement is 
associated in effect with the third factor, the special courts: “International 
merchants sat in the courts of piepowder and of the ports in so-called half-
tongue juries, [that is,] juries consisting as to one-half of native and the other 
half of foreign merchants.”56 
The second factor is the “universality of the customs of the sea”—a 
universality that extends across time as well as space. Again, the laws in 
question are the product of merchants themselves, without intervention by the 
state (or any intervention by jurists): 
The customs of the sea which originated with the Phoenicians and Greeks, were 
collected as the laws of Rhodes between A.D. 600 to 800; they were then developed 
into the Consulado del Mar, which became the maritime code of the Mediterranean, 
spread to the Atlantic as the judgments of Oléron (1160) which became the 
foundation of English maritime law, and further north to the Baltic where they were 
known as the Sea Laws of Visby. Professor Wormser rightly observes that “the 
explanation of this universality is . . . that the sea law was developed by merchants 
themselves and was not the law of territorial princes.”57 
The key legal concept in Schmitthoff’s story of medieval lex mercatoria is 
custom: we read of the customs of the sea, of an international customary law. 
The use of the term is not accidental: at the time when Schmitthoff wrote, 
custom was an accepted source of law in all major legal traditions, as well as in 
international law.58 Even in the context of decolonization, the concept of custom 
by itself caused less hostility and fear of a “Western bias” than the “general 
principles of law.”59 The legal definition of custom includes both effective 
practice over a long period and the awareness by those who follow the 
customary rule that they are bound by it (opinio juris). In continental legal 
history, bodies of customary law were eventually written down and even, at 
subsequent stages, turned into statutory law.60 
Schmitthoff himself presents international commercial custom as 
“consist[ing] of commercial usages and practices . . . so widely accepted that it 
has been possible to formulate them as authoritative texts.” His invocation of 
custom explains, and is triggered by, the emphasis given by the narrative on the 
role of the imagined “international business community” and the subsequent 
downplaying of the role of lawyers. In this understanding, traced back to 
German Romantic ideas about law, custom is the product of long practice and 
                                                          
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b) (1946). 
 59. Id. art. 38(1)(c) (referring to “general principles of law recognized by civilized countries”). 
 60. See, e.g., John P. Dawson, The Codification of French Customs, 38 MICH. L. REV. 765 (1940). 
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legal consciousness by the community; lawyers only come after the fact to give 
it formal legal shape. 
Schmitthoff has provided us with a theory about the legal nature of the 
medieval law merchant and the production process of lex mercatoria’s many 
norms. But he provides little discussion of how systematic, and complete, this 
law merchant was. Further down in Schmitthoff’s text, medieval mercantile law 
is likened to modern-day international law, and its rules are called “of 
haphazard and casual provenance,”61 but these ideas are not really elaborated—
we should perhaps not read into them more than Schmitthoff’s affirmation that 
the medieval law merchant is only the beginning of the story. 
2. The Early Modern Era: The Community of Merchants Meets the 
Nation-State 
We are thus led to the second phase, between the seventeenth and 
nineteenth centuries, when the juridification of the law merchant takes place: 
“In the second period of its development this cosmopolitan and universal law 
merchant was incorporated into the national laws of the various states.”62 
Schmitthoff’s key concept here is incorporation. The law merchant is 
“incorporated” into national law, codified, and perhaps given more systematic 
structure and better effectiveness. Schmitthoff expresses no regrets, whether 
because he understands the inevitability of overall “national integration,” or 
because this incorporation provides positive qualities to the law merchant. 
The incorporation process was “carried out in the various countries at 
different times and for different reasons”63—Napoleon’s Code de Commerce of 
1807, English common law under Lord Mansfield, the German Uniform 
Commercial Code of 186164—but was nonetheless “universal.”65 Incorporation 
did not mean absorption (or even integration): “even in this period of national 
integration commercial law did not lose entirely its international character.”66 
To prove the point, Schmitthoff deliberately puts together statements from 
different periods to emphasize the persistence of the law merchant and its 
spirit—one from Lord Mansfield in making use of civilian doctrines, one from 
Pollock almost three centuries later.67 
Incorporation does not mean, however, that the merchant spirit is dead. 
Having driven through his main point, Schmitthoff notes the continuing 
creative role of the merchants: “[T]he law-creating custom of the international 
business community was as active as in the Middle Ages.”68 Here, then, is 
continuity as well as progress in the evolution of international business law. 
                                                          
 61. Schmitthoff, supra note 29, at 108–09. 
 62. Id. at 107. 
 63. Id. at 106. 
 64. Id. at 107. 
 65. Id. at 106. 
 66. Schmitthoff, supra note 29, at 107. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
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Schmitthoff’s account brings together, in harmony, state law and mercantile 
practice. 
Schmitthoff’s evolutionary narrative legitimizes the synthesis of state law, 
intergovernmental instruments, and international business practice. On the one 
hand, to the extent that national mercantile laws did work, and incorporated 
international commercial custom, it was not a problem to accept state law—
national and international—as an integral part of the new law merchant, as well 
as to defend the plurality of institutions creating and sources constituting the 
law of international trade. On the other hand, Schmitthoff’s story of a living law 
merchant continuing to exist under the skin of national legislation legitimates 
the existence of, and need for, an autonomous law merchant. 
3. The Contemporary Phase: A Synthesis 
In 1957, Schmitthoff proclaimed the beginning of a third phase that looks, 
on first impression, like the first: “We are beginning to rediscover the 
international character of commercial law and the circle now completes itself: 
the general trend of commercial law everywhere is to move away from the 
restrictions of national law to a universal, international conception of the law of 
international trade.”69 
But this is not a full circle: the new law merchant is not a copy of the old law 
merchant; rather, Schmitthoff’s third phase comes as the synthesis of the first 
and second. First, it combines the nonstate character of the first with the state 
character of the second phase: “[T]he modern law of international trade is not a 
branch of international law; it does not form part of the ius gentium, but it is 
applied in every national jurisdiction by tolerance of the national sovereign 
whose public policy may override or qualify a particular rule of that law.”70 
Second, it combines the plural character of the first phase with the systematic 
one of the second: “[T]he modern law of international trade is not of haphazard 
and casual provenance but consists of norms, practices, or usages expressed in a 
number of authoritative texts. These texts have been compiled by international 
organizations and agencies.”71 
C. Schmitthoff’s Progress Narrative 
Schmitthoff’s modern law of international trade is “derived from two 
sources . . . international legislation and international commercial custom.”72 His 
historical narrative aims at legitimating both, and then joining them as parts of a 
coherent system. The first step is to assert the historical pedigree of 
international commercial custom—of international mercantile practice 
(autonomous from the state apparatus) producing norms. The second step is to 
legitimate the use of authoritative texts, which is fit into the story by his account 
                                                          
 69. Id. at 108 (quoting Clive Schmitthoff, Modern Trends in English Commercial Law, TIDSKRIFT 
UTGIVEN AV JURISDISKA FÖRENINGEN FINLAND 354 (1957)). 
 70. Id. at 108–09. 
 71. Schmitthoff, supra note 29, at 109. 
 72. Id.  
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of incorporation and coexistence of mercantile practice and state action. To this 
effect, Schmitthoff provides an optimistic tale of evolution, a progress narrative. 
Each phase in this narrative takes things up, adds qualities, and expands the 
geographical scope of mercantile law. Everybody has a place in the narrative: 
merchant communities, mainly, but also practitioners, visionary judges, and 
savvy legislators. 
Schmitthoff further uses history to describe and defend his vision of the 
modern law merchant as an “entirely new phenomenon”73 with its own “strange, 
synthetic character.”74 Apart from practical considerations, Schmitthoff favors 
this complexity as a matter of principle: a “global and universal code of 
international trade law . . . might . . . become a straitjacket which could slow 
down the growth of commercial practices and usages and could stifle the 
continued creation of customary law by the international business 
community.”75 He accordingly calls for his readers to “forget the Victorian 
predilection of orderliness” and “take [the new law merchant] as what it was in 
the Middle Ages and what it will be again: unsystematic, complex and 
multiform, but of bewildering vigour, realism and originality.”76 Medieval 
imagery is here used to liberate the new law merchant from the conceptual 
rigors of the immediate past, and possibly the present. 
III 
BERTHOLD GOLDMAN: LIVES AND  
DEATHS OF A (STATELESS) LEX MERCATORIA 
A. Berthold Goldman Situated 
Berthold Goldman (1913–1993) was born in Romania but received his legal 
education in France, obtaining his doctorate in civil law and then becoming a 
professor of private law.77 Although his interests ranged from commercial law 
proper to international law, Goldman was a private international lawyer by 
training. Goldman served for a long time as codirector of the Journal du Droit 
International. Also known as Clunet, this journal has, since its establishment in 
1874, been a major conduit of intellectual trends in private and public 
international law, and it remains alone among the major international journals 
of the continent in bringing together both of these sister disciplines. Over time, 
Goldman’s interest shifted to European and international business law.78 In the 
1960s, he produced an original treatise on European commercial law that has 
                                                          
 73. Id. at 112. 
 74. Id. at 111. 
 75. Id. at 112. 
 76. Schmitthoff, supra note 29, at 112. 
 77. See L'ACTUALITÉ DE LA PENSÉE DE BERTHOLD GOLDMAN: DROIT COMMERCIAL 
INTERNATIONAL ET EUROPÉEN (Philippe Fouchard & Louis Vogel, eds., 2004), and especially the 
biographical tributes at 11–13, 15–18. 
 78. See, e.g., Berthold Goldman, The Convention Between the Member States of the European 
Economic Community on the Mutual Recognition of Companies and Legal Persons, 6 COMMON MKT. 
L. REV. 104 (1968–1969). 
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been continued to this day.79 But Goldman’s main interest was in international 
commercial arbitration,80 and he acquired a formidable reputation in arbitration 
practice as one of the leading “grand old men” of that milieu.81 
Goldman was probably motivated to invent lex mercatoria as a legal system 
by both practical and theoretical concerns. He was probably less preoccupied 
than Schmitthoff with the Cold War divide between East and West, or the 
contrast between continental law and common law. He was, however, very 
much involved in the postcolonial conflicts between North and South.82 There 
was a notable desire by western lawyers to affirm the existence of a law 
“common” to North and South governing international business transactions—
whether by defending the suitability and neutrality of the existing 
“metropolitan” law or by elaborating a truly neutral or common law.83 
Moreover, the era of decolonization had seen several politically charged 
investment disputes, in which the application of the host state’s law could be 
seen as prejudicial to the interests of the other party. Indeed, the origins of lex 
mercatoria case law are traced to arbitral awards such as the petroleum cases 
opposing Arab countries and the big oil companies.84 Goldman did himself 
provide a few examples of such efforts: one example originally neglected by his 
disciples and recently restored to a prominent place in the genealogy of the 
modern lex mercatoria is a small piece, written during the Suez crisis, presenting 
the Suez Company as a truly international legal entity, rather than one of 
Egyptian, English, French, or mixed nationality.85 More generally, if the 
Schmitthoffian attitude was positivist and called for concrete legislative 
initiatives, many in Goldman’s milieu tried to solve the same problem by 
abstracting “general principles”: this may be attributed partly to their own 
academic sensibilities, partly to the pressing problems (pending cases) they 
were faced with. 
                                                          
 79. BERTHOLD GOLDMAN, DROIT COMMERCIAL EUROPÉEN (5th ed. 1994). 
 80. See, e.g., Berthold Goldman, Arbitrage international et droit commun des nations, REVUE DE 
L’ARBITRAGE 115 (1956) [hereinafter Arbitrage]. Near the end of his life, Goldman copublished with 
his former students Philip Fouchard and Emmanuel Gaillard a seminal treatise on international 
commercial arbitration. See PHILIP FOUCHARD, TRAITÉ DE L’ARBITRAGE COMMERCIAL 
INTERNATIONAL (1996). 
 81. Several references to Goldman’s status in the arbitration world can be found sprinkled in 
DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 3, at 53, 83 n.43. 
 82. Goldman’s first professorial position had been in French Indochina (Vietnam). In those days 
before the unraveling of the French empire, the first appointment of many professors after passing the 
aggregation examination was in the colonies. 
 83. See, e.g., the ad hoc award of July 2, 1956, by Messrs. Ripert and Panchaud, Société Européenne 
d’études et d’entreprises v. République fédérale de Yougoslavie, 86 JOURNAL DU DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL 1074 (1959), and the award of August 23, 1958, Aramco v. Saudi Arabia, 27 INT’L L. 
REP. 173 (1963) (both awards mentioned by Goldman, infra note 88, at 183–84). See also the ad hoc 
award of January 19, 1977, Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company v. The Government of the Libyan 
Arab Republic, 17 INT’L LEG. MATERIALS 3 (1978); ICC Award No.1434, 103 JOURNAL DU DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL 978 (1976). 
 84. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 3, at 85–86; Amr Shalakany, Arbitration and the Third 
World, 41 HARV. INT’L L. J. 419, 443–45 (2000). 
 85. See Berthold Goldman, La compagnie de Suez, Société internationale, LE MONDE, Oct. 4, 1956, 
at 3, available at http://tldb.uni-koeln.de/static/monde.shtml (last visited June 9, 2008). 
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Another set of considerations also weighed in with Goldman and his 
disciples—internationalist, private international lawyers by training, living the 
aftermath of the crisis of classical private—and public—international law. In the 
interwar period, the original, late-nineteenth-century internationalist projects of 
establishing a uniform conflict-of-laws regime had been fatally challenged. In 
the postwar era, the conflicts mainstream, like Henri Battifol, attempted to 
reconstruct the classical paradigm around a pragmatic internationalism.86 
Goldman and like-minded colleagues drew on interwar ideas about legal 
pluralism, corporatism, and even natural-law ideas.87 
The text regarded as the manifesto of lex mercatoria was the 1964 essay, 
Frontières du droit et lex mercatoria (Frontiers of Law and Lex Mercatoria), that 
Goldman published, symptomatically of his theoretical bent, in the French 
legal-theory yearbook Archives de Philosophie du Droit.88 In that essay, 
Goldman asserted that each lex mercatoria rule was a legal norm on its own.89 
He emphasized the “spontaneous,” “private” origin of these lex mercatoria 
rules, which were growing in number and acquiring their own structures.90 
Establishing beyond any reasonable doubt the juridical character of lex 
mercatoria norms was only the first step for Goldman. In subsequent works, he 
came to insist on the idea that lex mercatoria was acquiring the characteristics of 
a legal system or “legal order” (ordre juridique), which are the “specificity” 
(distinctness) of the rules that compose it, as well as of the social group in 
relation to whose activity they appear; the operation of these rules as a whole 
(ensemble); and the existence of organs capable of applying them.91 
B. A Story of Rebirth 
In a cyclical narrative, the main idea or construct has its glory days; then 
comes its decline, due to extrinsic or intrinsic factors, to be eventually followed 
by its return to the forefront. Cyclical narratives are a subcategory of repetition 
narratives, which tell the story of a legal field in terms of an idea or a conflict 
between contrasting notions persisting, or recurring, through time. If the demise 
is due to intrinsic factors, as in the case of a legal doctrine whose weaknesses 
were exposed, the main idea would have to mutate somehow. The strictest form 
                                                          
 86. See, e.g., HENRI BATIFFOL, ASPECTS PHILOSOPHIQUES DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ 
(1956). 
 87. See, e.g., SANTI ROMANO, L’ORDRE JURIDIQUE (Lucien François & Pierre Gothot trans., 
1975) (an early classic work on legal pluralism). On natural law, reference is often made to Phocion 
Franceskakis, Droit naturel et droit international privé, in 1 MÉLANGES OFFERTS À JACQUES MAURY 
113, 129 (1960). But see Goldman, Arbitrage, supra note 80, at 115–16. 
 88. Berthold Goldman, Frontières du droit et lex mercatoria, 9 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU 
DROIT 177 (1964). 
 89. Id. at 189. 
 90. Id.; See also Goldman, supra note 7, at 114. 
 91. Berthold Goldman, La lex mercatoria dans les contrats et l’arbitrage internationaux: réalité et 
perspectives, JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 475, 499 (1979). See also Berthold Goldman, Une 
bataille judiciaire autour de la lex mercatoria : L’affaire Norsolor, 1983 REVUE DE L’ARBITRAGE 379, 
406  (“L’ordre juridique est un ensemble de règles spécifiques et d’organes aptes à les appliquer . . . qui 
émerge de la formation de l’activité d’un groupe social lui-même spécifique.”). 
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of a cyclical narrative, however, attributes the demise of the main idea to 
extrinsic factors—the change of material circumstances, or the rise of hostile 
ideologies. 
Goldman’s historical account provides a characteristic example of a cyclical 
narrative. Schmitthoff’s three consecutive phases are here replaced by three 
recurring lives: 
Lex mercatoria is a venerable old lady who has twice disappeared from the face of the 
earth and twice been resuscitated. At the present moment, she still must content with 
some growth pains ordinarily associated with youth. My topic today is principally 
these problems of adolescence which lex mercatoria is currently confronting.92 
For Goldman, lex mercatoria is, even metaphorically speaking, a person: this 
implies a tangible identity and a personality. Lex mercatoria has moreover been 
the same person throughout—hence she is a “venerable old lady.” All the same, 
she presently undergoes “youthful growth pains.”93 Why this apparent 
contradiction? Because she has twice “disappeared” from the face of the 
Earth—and then twice come back. Something—or someone—must have caused 
her near death, and possibly something—or someone—else may have helped in 
resuscitating her.94 Cyclical narratives tend to either affirm the inevitability of 
such revivals or to provide a moral tale of the struggle facing the friends in 
order to prevent the need for a new “resuscitation”—or to convey both 
messages, more or less subliminally. 
1. Ius gentium: The Birth 
In Goldman’s narrative it is not medieval mercantile law but the Roman ius 
gentium that attracts our main attention—three times as much space is devoted 
to Roman law than to its subsequent decline and revival combined. Ius gentium 
is called “the illustrious precursor” of lex mercatoria.95 To bolster this claim, 
Goldman invokes lengthy passages from an essay by Phocion Franceskakis—
one of the most eminent figures in postwar, French private international law—
on natural law and private international law.96 Considering that the essay aimed 
at providing classical conflict of laws with a philosophical foundation 
transcending strict state-minded positivism, there is a subtle irony in its being 
used to support what eventually became an outright challenge to the conflict of 
laws. 
In referring to the ius gentium, Goldman reprises the notion of a private-
international-law system different from, and more ancient than, the traditional 
                                                          
 92. Goldman, supra note 29, at 3. 
 93. Id. at 23. 
 94. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 766 (2d ed. 1989), “resuscitate” (“[t]o restore (a person) to 
life (physical or spiritual) or to consciousness”). 
 95. Goldman, supra note 29, at 3. 
 96. Francescakis, supra note 87, at 129. Franceskakis was codirector with Henri Batiffol of the 
Revue Critique de Droit International Privé, perhaps the most prestigious journal in the field. Mentor to 
many among the younger generations of private international lawyers, Franceskakis was an influential 
exponent of the “pluralism of methods” theory which has marked modern European private 
international law. 
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choice of law. He is also interested in the influences that this “body of laws” 
drew from natural law. But he is most explicit in his fascination with the idea of 
Roman “reception of an international custom of commercial law.”97 For 
Goldman, the praetor peregrinus (who for some of Goldman’s contemporaries 
provided an early model of the judge applying lois de police98) is “this 
representative of Roman authority” who “doubtless borrowed from the 
customs of international commerce and from the less formalistic elements of 
the Roman law itself.”99 In fact, despite Goldman’s assurance, there is little 
historical evidence—but a lot of speculation—as to what ius gentium really was. 
Focus shifts to the customs of international commerce from which the praetor 
borrowed. But Goldman’s custom is not like Schmitthoff’s: while the lawmaking 
authority of the praetor is sidelined, no mention is made here of merchants or 
legal actors. What interests Goldman is the body of law itself. Indeed, ius 
gentium is “understood as a formally autonomous source of law.” As such, it 
by and large lost its distinctiveness when the Antonian Constitution of 212 A.D. 
accorded Roman citizenship to all inhabitants of the Empire [and thereby extended 
ius civile to all private relations in the Empire]. This was its first death. It was, 
however, not a real death, because ius gentium had by then penetrated the domain 
exclusively reserved for ius civile. It thereby enriched—and occasionally entirely 
supplanted—the traditional institutions of ius civile.100 
But “[t]his common law of nations fell victim . . . to the breakup of the Roman 
world and its legal system, and to the disintegration of international economic 
relations that characterized the early Middle Ages.”101 
So this is the first, effective death of lex mercatoria: the “common law of 
nations f[alling] victim” to political circumstances—the “breakup of the Roman 
world and its legal system,” and the “disintegration of international economic 
relations” (note, “disintegration,” not, for example, “decline” in scope).102 Such 
misfortune may justifiably make us weary of the political and the state 
structures: having become part of state law, our transnational customary law 
disintegrated with it. 
2. Middle Ages: The Revival 
Goldman dedicates far less space to medieval mercantile law: it is after all 
the “rebirth” of the ancient cosmopolitan law.103 Moreover, reference is made to 
manifestations (“it was manifest”) of the lex mercatoria under different names: 
“the ley merchant, in England, the droit de foires in France . . . , the ius 
mercatorum conceived in Italy, and the commercial usages codified in France by 
Jacques Savary at the end of the seventeenth century and fifty years later by his 
                                                          
 97. Goldman, supra note 29, at 3. 
 98. See, e.g., HENRI BATIFFOL & PAUL LAGARDE, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ 21 (1993). 
 99. Goldman, supra note 29, at 3. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
HATZIMIHAIL__BOOK PROOF_FINAL.DOC 10/27/2008  7:47:10 AM 
186 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 71:169 
son.”104 This seems to be a single legal phenomenon manifested in distinct form 
(and name) in different places. 
Whereas Goldman sounds romantic in his references to the lex mercatoria 
and legal cosmopolitanism, he demonstrates none of the lyricism shown by 
Schmitthoff-the-pragmatist toward mobile merchants. In fact, Goldman makes 
no reference to merchants. The law simply appears—just like Goldman’s ius 
gentium, it is the product of a rather spontaneous process. But the focus here is 
less on professional merchants than in other images of spontaneous law. 
3. Early Modern Era: The Specter of State Law 
As Goldman’s second period coincides with Schmitthoff’s first, so his next 
period coincides with Schmitthoff’s second phase. Goldman’s outlook, however, 
is grimmer: “a new period of hibernation awaited.”105  Hibernation may mark a 
subtle change from the invocations of death and near death; but the general 
idea is precisely to emphasize simultaneously the mortal perils and the survival 
through time of lex mercatoria. The dark character of what is to befall lex 
mercatoria in the early modern era is better illustrated as Goldman contrasts 
the imperial Roman “unification of a legal and . . . national character—as that 
engendered by the Constitution of Caracalla” (which still maintained a 
“common law of nations” as well as the continuing influence of the ius gentium) 
with the early-modern destruction of legal community by the “progressive 
affirmation of the power of individual States.”106 There is no mention of the 
terms “nation” or “national”—only subsequently, in the nineteenth century, is 
there talk of “national particularities.”107 The rival here is the Leviathan, not the 
nations: “In France, this development was marked by the codification of 
Colbert in 1673 of laws for terrestrial commerce, and, in 1681, for maritime 
commerce.”108 
What Schmitthoff fit into a progress narrative, Goldman invokes as an 
example of regress. It is also interesting that, although it is commonly accepted 
that the Crown’s ordinances were based on Savary’s private codifications, 
Goldman makes no such allusions. The line between merchant custom and state 
law appears absolute, and the mediating role of lawyers fades out. 
The low point in this story comes in the nineteenth century, as the 
“emergence and reinforcement of national particularities” leads to the 
“subjection of international economic relations to State laws.”109 These state 
laws are designated by conflict-of-laws rules “such . . . as each State had 
established by itself.”110 Here again, Goldman draws an opposition in absolute 
terms, in which conflicts rules are on the side of the Leviathan. Missing from his 
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picture is the internationalism of nineteenth-century conflict of laws—
ironically, a movement in which the law journal directed by Goldman (then 
named Journal de Droit International Privé) was pivotal. 
Goldman’s narrative is one of a variety of “internationalist” stories of the 
rise of “legal nationalism” that comes to permeate conflict of laws and that may 
be linked, depending on the perspective of the narrator, on trade protectionism, 
political nationalism, et cetera.111 But Goldman does not seem to have a strong 
political agenda against the nation-state. What he does care about, however, is 
the formal source of legal rules and the creation of a stateless legal regime. 
Schmitthoff insisted on the image of incorporation of merchant law, with the 
state providing a protective shell, in order to further his normative agenda of 
producing authoritative texts by bringing together customary rules, mercantile 
practice, and state legislation. Goldman spins instead a cautionary tale, in which 
state law, followed by legal particularism, can only corrupt the law merchant. 
4. Lex Mercatoria Rediviva 
Goldman’s narrative leads to the next episode, in which leading lawyers 
from both East and West “discover” that “the way in which international 
commerce is regulated today . . . is as unsatisfactory as it can be.”112 The only 
lengthy quotation in Goldman’s entire article studied here is a passage in that 
vein by René David, calling that state of affairs “an affront to reason . . . a 
source of shame for jurists.”113 The Romanian Tudor Popescu is also quoted, 
calling for a “uniform law of international commerce” as a necessary 
implication of the “establishment of a new international economic order.”114 
However, although united in their desire, the two authors take radically 
different perspectives: David “accords great importance to transnational 
customary law, spontaneously engendered by the interaction of merchants in 
international trade”115 (and progressing even without the lawyers). Popescu, 
“faithful to socialist notions of law” would accept only international treaties.116 
Schmitthoff, as we have seen, would seek to integrate both views in one 
coherent whole.117 But where does Goldman stand? Unlike Popescu, he does 
regard customary law as a valid source and in fact alleges that David “in his 
virulence did not take into account the second rebirth and the incipient 
evolution of transnational customary law”—by which he means principally 
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standard and model contracts—since the early twentieth century.118 He is, on the 
contrary, less interested in state-based sources of international trade law, and 
criticizes Schmitthoff’s broad definition of lex mercatoria for not providing an 
answer to the “specific problems of transnational commercial custom.”119 
Goldman is more concerned with whether “general principles of law and 
principles of international law” form “part of lex mercatoria”—a problem to 
which he devotes the rest of his article, invoking legal theory and listing cases in 
which lex mercatoria was accepted as a source by state laws and courts.120 
Through this detailed discussion, there is barely any explicit reference to 
merchants as norm creators; it is to arbitral awards that Goldman turns in 
rebutting skeptics’ argument that no societas mercatorum exists.121 “Custom,” 
although an everpresent notion, appears in very abstract terms: discussion 
revolves around principles applied (that is, accepted) in arbitral awards, and 
their acknowledgement by state courts (and legislation) through these awards’ 
enforcement.122 
C. Goldman’s Circles 
Goldman would determine “the ambit of lex mercatoria” by reference to “its 
origin and its customary, and thus spontaneous, nature,” rather than to the 
“object of its constituent elements.”123 Obviously, even in a text written twenty 
years after his Frontiers essay, Goldman maintains a purist perspective, as far as 
the role of state sources is concerned. But what are we to make of his reference 
to the customary nature of lex mercatoria? His equation of customary with 
spontaneous, especially, seems different from the traditional understanding of 
custom as the result of long, conscious practice—but it is also different from the 
notion of a spontaneous “order without law” promoted by legal economists: 
Goldman’s notion is more abstract, and more legalist.124 
Goldman’s historical narrative plays into both themes. It reflects his “purist” 
perspective on the sources of lex mercatoria. Unlike Schmitthoff’s tale of 
evolution and synthesis, here is a tale of ups and downs, lives and (near) deaths. 
The “lives” take place in those periods in which an international or 
supranational law of universal ambit flourishes unhindered and acknowledged 
by state law. The “deaths” come when the international community 
disintegrates and competing political entities claim control over international 
commerce and mercantile law. 
The narrative also reflects Goldman’s abstract notion of what lex mercatoria 
is—an abstractness hidden behind, as well as unveiled by, his personification 
metaphor. There are recurring references to a body of law, but no explicit 
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reference to merchant, or legal, practitioners. Goldman’s lex mercatoria is 
“spontaneous” in that it simply appears: there is no account of its gradual 
creation. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
In the beginning of this article, reference was made to the Arlésienne—the 
young lady who never appears on stage in the theatrical play named after her, 
allowing us to imagine her as we would like.125 Lex mercatoria—a concept often 
personified—has allowed its many advocates a similar freedom. Their accounts 
of past lives of lex mercatoria reflect—and in their turn nourish—their visions 
and normative projects. 
This article studied the accounts of the two founding fathers of lex 
mercatoria, who are also identified with the two principal approaches within the 
mercatorist coalition. Schmitthoff sought to construct a uniform law of 
international trade with merchant customs and trade practices alongside 
international instruments, and possibly national legislation. He even suggested 
that such coexistence may allow for better growth and adaptability of 
international business law in the long run. Goldman was, on the contrary, 
preoccupied with providing a theory of an autonomous legal system 
independent from (while respected by) state legal systems (including 
intergovernmental institutions). Both are in effect seeking to provide 
theoretical foundations for something: Schmittthoff seeks a foundation for 
international legislative initiatives and for “vertical” academic treatment of 
international business law. Goldman seeks a legal justification for arbitrators 
using their good judgment, their knowledge of, and “feel” for the law. 
All this is reflected in their historical narratives. Schmitthoff offers an 
account of evolution and synthesis: his emphasis is less on the “law merchant” 
as a single entity, and more on its constituent parts and stakeholders. Goldman, 
to the contrary, puts a more abstract idea of a single cosmopolitan law in the 
center of his story. In Schmitthhoff we can imagine pictures of mobile 
merchants engaged in transnational commerce; eminent lawyers—who 
systematize, incorporate, codify, and legislate—also make cameo appearances. 
In Goldman, the only being who looks alive is the personified lex mercatoria—a 
venerable lady. In Goldman’s account, merchants exist only in terms of a 
societas mercatorum that in turn exists only as the creator or foundation of the 
lex mercatoria: even his invocation of the ius gentium (omitted in Schmitthoff’s 
narrative) may be explained in these terms. This does not mean, however, that 
Goldman espouses Platonic idealism: his vision of the lex mercatoria legitimates 
the role of specific professional groups among academics and practitioners 
active in international business law and commercial arbitration. 
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Competing as they may appear, the two narratives do share a lot. They do 
not differ in their basic facts (medieval customary law, early modern 
incorporation by state law, low-key persistence of innovative mercantile 
practice, postwar resurgence of transnational commercial law). They share this 
normative commitment to the autonomous regulation of transnational business, 
which is characteristic of all mercatorists. They also share, along with most 
mercatorist literature, their basic sentiment—what another author calls “the 
romance of the law merchant.”126 
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